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The County of Los Angeles was established on February 18, 1850, 
as one of the 27 original counties of California. In 1852, the 
Legislature created the office of Supervisor, and five Supervisors were 
elected to govern the County. Since 1887, the term of service has been 
4 years. Table I exhibits the average number of terms served per 
Supervisor for various periods; the average is rising, suggesting that 
Supervisors have become more career-oriented (as have Congressmen) 
over the course of the ninteenth and twentieth centuries. (The evidence-
for this suggestion is not as clear as in the Congressional case, 
1 however, where the tenure evidence, besides being clearer, can be 
mortised with data on the institutionalization of Congress.)2 
If it cannot be proven that Supervisors have become more 
career-oriented, it is certainly clear that their job has become 
vastly more difficult and powerful. In 1913, the Board governed a 
County of 600,000 people, supervising a bureaucracy with 3,300 employees 
and a budget of $4,000,000. Since then, both the people and employees 
have increased more than an order of magnitude and the budget roughly 
three orders of magnitude. Unfortunately for the Supervisors, their 
salary has not quite kept pace with the budget and has increased only 
about an order of magnitude (in nominal dollars); it is presently 
at $51,624. 
For this $51,624, the Supervisors are expected to gov�rn 
Loo Aogeleo County. The legal p�r• with which they are l enl�[d to 
perform this task seem ample; they have the power to: appoilt 11 I 
agency and department heads except the Sheriff, District  ttJrn y, 
and Assessor; approve an annual budget outlining the posi iols and 
I expenditures of all departments; provide, publish and enf rce code 
of rules prescribing in detail the administrative duties f la I 
I department and institution in the County; set the salarie of 11 I 
nonelecied Co�cy peroo�el; deiermine Co�iy and "Pecial dilt ict I 
policy; adopt ordinances to regulate public conduct in th uii corpa 
areas; act as an Appeals Board in zoning, licensing and aisselsment 
J  matters. In sum, the Board is the supreme executive and legis ative authority in County affairs, and has important quasi-jud cia� lower� I of a � as well. When a Supervisor wishes to insure the impleme tatio I 
policy, his involvement can be quite determinative and d taiie1 
example, one Superivsor has been involved in the writing of �ol 
classifications, after the passage of the Ordinance he s onsbred 
created a new Department of Consumer Affairs. Another h s slt 
1imetablea for the Health Dep�i�nt to complete explici •�ep in 
reorg�iaaiion, including date• for ihe provioion of a u w or· ni•a! chart for the agency and for the regional organizations ntl w ich I Department io now divided."3 In general, of couroe, pulley 1� roig 
is much broader and less specific (a good deal of it beitg perlorme 
by the Chief Administrative Officer),4 but this does not al�er the 
Supervisors' de jure power. 
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TABLE 1 
AVERAGE TENUREl OF BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, IN TERMS 
Period2 Terms/Persons 3 Avera�e Tenure 4 
1852-1868 65/44 1.48 
1869-1886 47/31 1.52 
1887-1909 32/23 1.39 
1911-1928 24/13 1.85 
1930-1948 30/12 2.5 
1950-1968 22/5 4.4 
1970-Incomplete 
Period 
1 The average tenure is figured on the basis of the following 
considerations: 1) Terms, rather than years, are counted. The 
length of the term is not taken into account. 2) A supervisor is 
counted at the year he was first elected. The results are even 
more striking when years are used. Terms increased in length from 
one year, 1852-53 to four years after 1887. 
2 The first three periods were constructed to coincide with changes 
in the formal provisions regarding elections and the length of 
Supervisors' terms. The last three approximate twenty-year periods. 
For purposes of comparability, the chart does not include 
information past 1968 as this current twenty-year period has not 
yet elapsed. 
3 The number of terms served divided by the number of men serving 
during that period of eime. For example, from 1852 to 1868, there 
were 65 terms served altogether. This figure is divided by 44, 
the number of different men who served these terms. 
4 The average tenure. 
#3 above. Thus, for 
tenure of 1.48 terms 
This figure results from the calculations in 
1852 to 1868, 65/44 represents an average 
per person. 
Source: Public Commission on Los Angeles Government, The Central 
Executive Structure and Decision-Making Processes of the Los Angeles 
County Government, p. 58. 
Reeent n�paper aeeoune' of ehe B�rd have �p a,Jae< thil 
potency: "Nowhere else in the U.S. does any elected offi·iaJ have 
this much uncontrolled power.115 Also noted have been the BoJrd!s 
invisibility to the general public,6 the custom of allowi g Jae I 
Superivsor to determine matters localized in his district (rJci roct 
and Supervisorial job security: there was no change in tle 1m ersJI. 
. I of the Board from 1958 to 1972. This last observation un erpinb 
n�'paper aeeo�e' of � ineumbeney advaneage7 and '�'' o�e bn eh 
ana1yeie u,efulne•• of the eleeeora1 eo�eetion a''�peio� '1 the 
8 County context. 
In this paper we focus on a much-commented allo ative rule 
! 
in use by the Board: the so-called "rule of five". This , is a orma1�� 
voted-upon policy and directs that c
.
ertain nonmandated fu[d' be div,� 
eq�lly �ong't the five Supe�isorial Di,triet,. Seetio I de eri� I I 
the operation of the rule in a few cases. Section II att mpts mot
abstract explanation. Section III concludes. 
I. 
Precisely when the rule of five got started is nclealr. 
Kenny Hahn, Supervisor of the second District since 1952, hab tate& 
that "The County was formed in 1852 and since 1852 they'v • . • l I divided by five • . • • We've always divided by five, no t r  e or
ten, because there's only five of us.119 Other old-time C unly 
I- Iemployee' have ,eated ehat the rule wa' in operation for p "}o g ''t 
or as "long as they could remember." 
I 
5 
But the question of the starting date of the rule of five 
is tied to its area of application. Perhaps by focusing on particular 
funds we can say something more definite about when the practice began. 
To this end and to illustrate the details of the rule, we consider 
the use of the divide-by-five principle in the Parks and Recreation 
Department and in the Road Department. 
The operation of the rule of five in the Parks Department 
began following a vote by the Board in 1975 which "adopted in principle 
a policy for Park Capital Projects financing that park money be 
divided as equally as possible among the 5 Supervisorial Districts.1110
From at least the early 1950s until 1975, Parks capital projects had 
been handled through an informal universalistic process; there was 
no fixed formula as to how much went into each District, and in 
particular, there was no agreement in principle that funds be divided 
equally.11 In fact, federal grant funds are categorical by nature, 
and "it is difficult, if not impossible, to distribute them evenly 
between Supervisorial Districts. "12 Chart I shows the percent.age 
division of the pie for 1970-1975; these figures can be taken as roughly 
accurate for some time back into the 1960s. The 4th District got such 
a low percentage of funds because (1) capital projects expenditure by 
the Beaches Department was construed as compensation (indeed, until 1969, 
the beaches were administered by the Parks Department, and thus beach 
capital expenditures were included in the total Parks budget) and (2) 
the District has a relatively small, unconcentrated, and wealthy 
unincorporated population. Districts 1 and 5 received 69 percent of 
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7 
all grant monies in the period 1964-1975, illustrating the benefits to 
a District of having large open spaces at a time when federal grants 
favored regional parks. Land and Water grants, for example, favored 
(until 1976) large, water oriented parks such as Castaic in District 5. 
While there was no formal or informal agreement upon equality 
in project funds, each Supervisor advocated the needs of his own 
District, and was actively concerned that his District receive a 
"fair share". The Parks Department prepared capital projects budgets 
by District and reviewed these budgets with each Supervisor. Supervisors 
showed interest not just in their own budget, but in their budget 
vis-a-vis the other Districts.13 The Parks Department was sensitive 
to the demands of each Supervisor and would make special efforts to 
come up with suitable projects in the "short" Districts. At one point, 
for example, the Parks Department Head arranged for the transfer of 
a park from the City of Los Angeles to the County in order to satisfy 
the insistent demands of one Supervisor for a project. 
In general then, we can view the Parks project funds 
allocation in the pre-1975 period as based on (1) the needs calculations 
of the Department and (2) the criteria attached to the various funds 
sources, as mitigated by (3) the political reality of geographically-
based representatives going to bat for their Districts. Any pressure 
toward equality per se took place in the larger context of the total 
capital projects budget. 
This state of affairs changed in 1975. On June 11, the Board 
voted 4 to 1 (Mr. Schabarum voting no) to adopt in principle the 
divide-by-five approach. On the same date, they directed the Parks 
Department to prepare a report on the consequences and meuitsl of 
various allocational methods (including the method then i use and 
the newly proposed division by five) . Parks produced the eplr ·to ti 
Board of Supervisors on Alternative: Capital· Project Alloc tioh race� 
which ranked the proposed policy fifth and last. The Boa�d d�djnot 
publicly consider the report and ·voted to adopt the rule Jf f�v in
August. 
The practical effects of this vote include a gr,ater �quali 
of project funds between Districts (as expected) , and a c�angl in 
Supervisorial-Department relations. 
The change in Supervisorial-Department relationjhips is 
simply that the Supervisors are no longer as active in re istlr�ng 
demands for projects with the Department; since their sha e o� fiunds 
is fairly certain, there is no need. This does not mean tihat 
The Head Park Blanhei hall Supervisors no longer watch their budget. 
monthly meetings with Supervisor Schabarum, and close conrlactl ii 
maintained with deputies from the other Districts. 
The allocational equality achieved by the vote ls nbtjprec 
since 95 percent of the Parks project budget in recent ye rs la I 
involved categorical funding, which, as noted above, is diff�cu t to 
distribute equally amongst Districts; Districts do not ha le e�ual 
ability to provide projects which meet source criteria. nly[51perce 
of the budget, then, is usable for balancing purposes. 0 ce ' u*ding 
for projects has been lined up, the budget must still be ppr�v�d by 
the Chief Administrative Office, which may delete a proje t b� tefusi 
matching county funds. Thus, in practice, the 20 percentltaJge 
s, 
+ 14 may be missed by - 5 percent. 
9 
The practice of targeting 20 percent of Road capital project 
funds to each District began in fiscal year 1973-74, pursuant to a 
combination of Board order and informal agreement. 15 From the late 
1940s til the early 1970s Road project funds had been distributed 
according to a fixed percentage formula, roughly 25 percent to the 
first District, with 20 percent, 15 percent, 20 percent, and 20 percent 
h . . D" . (" d ) 16 to t e remaining istricts in or er • 
This formula was already accepted procedure in 1950. The 
former Roads Connnissioner conjectures that the practice developed 
after the Second World War when the Roads project budget was first 
attaining a significant size. Faced with the problem of distributing 
a significant amount of funds, the planners simply looked at the last 
year's percentage breakdown and aimed to repeat it. The Board formally 
ratified this decision at some point before 1950, and the shares 
thus established were adhered to until the early 1970s. The Department 
was able to hit the allocational target precisely because a large part 
of its funds were discretionary (highway user's tax, gas tax). 
them. 
Not all the Supervisors were happy with the shares allotted 
Ernest Debs, Supervisor of the y::E. District (getting the 
smallest share) was especially desirous of a change and Supervisor 
Hahn joined him in this desire. Supervisors Bonnelli, Chace and Dorn 
were content with the traditional formula, and since they constituted 
a majority, no change was effected. 
This was the situation until sometime before the early fall 
of 1971, when Mr. Dorn changed his mind.17 Mr. Debs' chief deputy 
arranged a meeting of chief' deputies at that time and th 
switching to an equal division was agreed upon. The 1st 
was to take about a 2 percent cut in the next fiscal yea 
. . rd July 1973), the 2 percent going to the F--=- District. Th 
year (1973-1974) , complete equality was to be establishe 
mann 
isbrjJct 
(Jll 
I 
r of 
1972 
wing [ foll.l 
18 I At so 
point, the Board (at least informally) ratified this plarl, ahd it w.11 
implemented as agreed. J The present operation of the rule of five in t e Rba 
Depar<menr is fairly srable. A rypioal reoenr y�r mighl b, dlsoril 
as foll�• (wirh rhe figures fnr any giv� year varying tro�dlrhe 
�es giv�) • our of roral deparrm�ral reve�es of $70 mil�io 
$20 million for capital projects is left over after mainJenanck and
operaring �p�ses are ocivered. This $20 mi11ion and r�l $, mlllio 
fr� rhe federal Aid ro Ciries progr� are divided by fif • Jm ••• 
following fashion: the Aid to Cities funds are distributed ltolthe 
cities by a federal formula based on population and main!airtedlmil 
and the $20 million is then apportioned among the Supervlso�ia 
Districts so as to equalize the dollar amounts spent on lapJta 
projects. 19 Each Supervisor can keep a detailed eye on toaJ p 
in his district because (1) the Road Department's Progr� DJve 
Division puts together a "proposed project budget", in c ns1t 
with the relevant Supervisor (for each district) , and (2 tJe same 
division provides each Supervisor with comprehensive man hlJ pjrojec 
20 I 
ojec·. 
II op me· 
tioj 
management reports. In recent years then, each Superv sor cbuld 
count on somewhat less than $6 million for road projects ! in lhiF diilll� 
olicJ of t As we have seen, the rule of five as a public 
ct.
11 
Board of Supervisors dates from the early 1970s in the Roads Department 
and from 1975 in the Parks Department. How can we reconcile this with 
the statement by Hahn at the beginning of this section? The probable 
answer is that "divide by five" may not refer to a recognized 
agreement (formal or informal) that certain funds be distributed 
equally but rather to the natural tendency of equal representatives 
to demand their "share". In the next section we examine the 
consequences of this natural tendency from an abstract perspective. 
II. 
Consider five individuals "representing" five distinct 
geographical regions in a decision-making body (dmb) which operates by 
majority-rule. The dmb is presented with a time-stream of dollars to 
be divided among the regions at successive meetings. 21 Influences on 
individual behavior -- legal, institutional, "expectational" -- may 
exist. In particular, we consider influences deriving from the 
relationship between representatives and regions and from the "other 
duties" of the dmb. 
We begin with a game of divide the dollar. (Regions are 
suppressed; their relationship to individuals is as pocketbooks. The 
dmb has no other duties. We assume players maximize expected utility 
and that utility is a function solely of income from the division of 
the dollar. ) 22 What will be the result? The core is empty, but the 
set of ten payoff vectors K = { (l/3,l/3,l/3,0,0), • . •  , (0,0,l/3,l/3,1/3) } 
is both a main-simple V-set and a Strong Competitive Solution, so that 
for a single play of the division game, we might 
23 K as the majority rule outcome. 
Now suppose that before 
is held on the question of establishing (or not) a 
is simply a suggested division of the dollar with the 
if subsequent meetings adhere to the norm, there are 
if subsequent meetings deviate from the norm, there 
the present context, costs may be considered a random 
associated with breaking tradition or repealing 
the norm. By symmetry, we assume that the only 
24 is (l/5,l/5,l/5,l/5,1/5,). 
Will the players vote for this norm? 
to ensure that they will are given below. 
that individuals' estimates of their probability of mPmhPri'i 
winning coalitions are low enough relative to their 
(or, equivalently, the individuals are risk-averse enou2h 
their probability estimates) . 
Let gi be the payoff to i, 0 S gi S 1 
pi (gi) be i's subjective probability of receiv 
payoff gi' given that there is no norm 
ui be i's utility function 
EVi be i's expected dollars if the norm is not 
�i be i's risk premium 
ri be the number of meetings i expects to attehd. 
I 
1 VOiinorm 
thl 
I , bu� 
rJ do+' 
ishir 
 0 
d 
12 
t 
Proposition: Suppose that it costs nothing to vote on the norm and 
that players consider the costs of violating the norm to be effective 
in preventing violations. Then if TI. > ri[J0
1 p. (gi)g . dg. i i i /i 
at least three players i, the norm will be adopted. 
Proof: Each player calculates 
EVi = ri f� pi (gi)gidgi 
Tiiis defined by: 
ui (EVi - Tii) = ri J� pi (gi)ui (gi)dgi 
The norm will be voted for by i if: 
ui (ri/5) > ri f� pi (gi)ui (gi)dgi ui (EVi - Tii) 
and thus if: 
ri 1 
-S- > Evi - ni � ni > ri[fo pi (gi)gidgi - 1/5] 
1/5] for 
This proposition shows that risk aversion in the context of a series 
of dollar divisions creates a rational desire to constrain future 
choices. Clearly, if the process of dividing the dollar costs 
something, the norm has another argument in its favor. 
One cost might simply be time: it takes some to wrangle 
13 
over the division. Perhaps the players ask themselves before the first 
meeting: What is the least time-costly method of division? The 
answer is clear: any method entailing no meeting. In the present 
model, we construe "no meeting" to mean that no communication occurs 
between players. They must simply submit a vector as their vote, 
knowing that if two or more others happen to submit the same division, 
then that will be the result. How would the reader vote? Symmetry 
strongly suggests that the majority result, if any, wou 
norm. Thus, the norm may be construed as the status qu 
the first meeting (before any tradition exists) in the 
would be the only plausible majority rule choice if the 
d He + ::J:e::at 
he 
minimized (set to zero) time costs of bargaining. 
Considerations of the cost of dividing the do/llar 
considerations raised by the proposition may have their l emJir 
relevance in the votes taken by the Board in 1971 and 1�75 Ito 
establish the policy that roads and parks funds be divi�ed �y 
nd t 
cal 
of fi 
fivell 
The details of the 1975 vote are a mixed bag las lfar as 
conforming to our expectations based on the propositionJ h'fever. 
The instigator of the divide by five policy was Baxter jard, ·uper. 
of the fifth District. As Chart I shows, the fifth Dislridt ot 
30 percent of the capital projects funds in the years 1 70Jl9 5. a 
if Ward believed in 1975 tbat the fut�e wae going to 1 ok li e thl 
recent past as far as parks went, he was either quite r sk-av rse o 
the proposition does not describe his behavior. (Note JhaJ n ne o� 
the other Supervisors pose this problem.) Conjectures ls Jo ard' � 
motivation include: (1) a desire to curb the aggressivl ajd ucce� 
pureuit of funde by one or �re other Supervieore; a d•Ji'J' t red�� competition for monies, (2) a desire to protect his future 1$cal 
parks funding: by the acres/population measure of needjwhJch was t. l �accepted County criterion, the fifth District was the 1 ast n edy � 
1975 (see Table II). Both of these conjectures presumejtha[� ard d 
not believe that the future would look as good as the p st �o his l 
District, and they thus render the proposition more pla.sib�y 
14 
lly 
or 
s, 
ul 
15 
applicable. 25 Ward's publicly-stated reason for pushing the rule of 
five, however, is simply that he considers it equitable. The present 
model of course admits of no considerations of fairness, and thus 
fails to explain Ward's behavior to the extent that it was based on 
such considerations. 
The proposition could be confronted with the 1971 vote and 
even (with a slight modification) with the late 1940s vote, if any 
details were known. The 1940s vote does indicate that a desire to 
stabilize and render predictable is probably the strongest argument 
of the proposition, since John Anson Ford, the Supervisor of the third 
District who accepted the 15 percent share, has stated that 
considerations of need, another concept not comprehended by the 
proposition, entered into his decisions. 26 
And yet, there is not a lot of unpredictability as to the 
percentage breakdown of the County's total capital projects budget. 
At least, there is not as much unpredictability in the County as there 
is in the model. The model leads to a member of K if the norm is not 
adopted. But we do not observe many 3-2 votes (see Table (III)), much 
less members of K, in the County. 
Why not? What factors might account for the absence of 
members of K in the allocation of the County project budget? This is 
essentially the question of "Why universalism? " The reader is 
referred to Fiorina for an answer preserving economic assumptions. 27 
Going beyond economic assumptions, we note that the notion of 
"fairness" is certainly a major feature of the rhetoric of distributional 
politics in the County. As a summary without expatiation we might say 
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that certain economic considerations coupled with considerations of 
fairness conduce to universalism. 
But the existence of universalism in the County reminds us 
of an interesting feature of the model. The particular form of 
universalism known as the rule of five is less likely in a generally 
universalistic dmb than in a dmb fraught with minimal winning coalitions. '°0 "' N CX) I CX) '° I ""'" N ""'0 N ""' '° '° 
This is simply because there is less uncertainty in a universalistic .-1 P.
dmb, and the rule of five serves largely to reduce uncertainty. We ul' I ..;i:: 
z "' QJ 
0 ..., !:l conclude that in a universalistic dmb, and relative to a H i:: E-< QJ '"' 
� (,) QJ '"' :> 
non-universalistic dmb, considerations of cost in the division of the p:: QJ I 0 p.. "' p.. C!l 
� .... °' > 
dollar (and non-economic considerations such as fairness) may be more p.. .-1 I ..., e;: ..;- §0 
z u potent in leading to a vote for the norm. 0 QJ 
H i:: Ill H z ;:l QJ 
This is not to say that we believe that fairness was a more 
H 0 ..., .-1 
H Ill QJ 
r..l E-< I '"' bl 
,..:i u "' .)ii important factor than uncertainty in the admittedly universalistic :;j ..: "' .-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .... .-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
E-< C/l °' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ill 
p:: .-1 q � ,..:' ..;- ..;- � ._; � 0 Board of Supervisors. We have our doubts since (1) needs-based 0 0 .... 0 °' 0 ,..:i C/l .,.;- i:: .-1 .... .-1 °' °' CX) .-1 H ·..-i 0 CX) ""'" "' "' CX) '° QJ 
28 � .-1 ._; .,.;- ._; � .,.;- .i:: formulae seem to us fairer and (2) such formulae are clearly ..., 0 ""'" .... N ..., r..l .-1 i:: ""'" ""' ""'" °' °' p.. .,.; ;:l .-1 ..... 
::i '"' 0 0 
inferior to the rule of five on the counts of uncertainty and cost of 
C/l � � Ill 
� QJ 
0 Ill 
Ill 
division. Since needs-based formulae do seem to us fairer and are � 
QJ (,) 
0 
generally universalistic, we wondered what reasons there might be 
0 '"' 
<Cl p.. 
i:: bl 
( besides uncertainty and cost of division) that the rule of five was 
0 i:: 
•..-i .,.; 
Ill i:: i:: QJ .>:: 
Ill "'Cl 0 0 ..., QJ f adopted over such formulae. "'Cl ;:l QJ .,.; •..-i 0 Ill QJ (,) ..., ..., ..., :> .-1 N .-1 (/) Ill Ill ..., "' "' I I I i:: 
0 •..-i .,.; "'Cl "'Cl ..., ""'" ""' ""' 0 
A fundamental reason seems to be the multiplicity of needs 
0.. q � 0 i:: S! g .,.; •..-i 0 "'Cl ..: QJ .-1 i:: Ill '"' '"' QJ 0 u � u s 0.. QJ •..-i 
p.. 0 ;:l u s C/l (,) 
formulae that are conceivable. No particular needs formula is clearly 
..... i:: ..., 0 ..., 0 QJ 
.-1 •..-i .-1 tJ tJ 0.. tJ QJ q "' "'Cl ..., "' QJ QJ QJ QJ (/) ..., .-1 i:: ..., ·r-il:t: (,) p:: (/) "80 QJ 0 0 QJ tJ "'
superior to the rest and thus arguments for one over another may be E-< ::i:: u E-< p:: ..: -"' 
fairly subtle or intricate, while equal division has a simple and 
prima facie reasonable explanation: equal populations and tax shares 
!__ __ 1 1 •. 
19 
should induce equal projects expenditures. The multiplicity of needs 
formulae also means that a "Schelling effect" is possible. Schelling 
conducted a series of experiments as follows (no communication allowed 
in any of them): 
(1) Two-player divide the dollar; result-equal division. 
(2) "A and B have incomes of $100 and $150 per year, 
respectively. They are notified of each other's income 
and told that they must begin paying taxes totaling $25 
per year each is to write down the share he proposes 
to pay, and if the shares total $25 or more, each will pay 
exactly as proposed. If the proposed shares fail to add 
up to $25 . • .  each will pay the full $25 . • . 11;29 result­
division proportional to income. 
(3) Same as (2) , but additional information is given-on 
spending habits, family size, etc.; result-equal division. 
"Here the unique attraction of the income-proportionate 
split apparently became so diluted that the preponderant 
reply from both the high-income and the low-income 
respondents was a simple 50-50 division of the tax. The 
refined signal for the income proportionate split was 
drowned out by 'noise', and the cruder signal for equality 
30 was all that came through. " 
An example of this type of effect in the County is provided 
by the controversy over the Board's allocation of some juvenile 
justice funds early in 1979. The funds had come from the state with 
the proviso that a citizens' commission be allowed to review the 
community groups applying for the grant funds, and recommend who 
should get it. An advisory commission was formed and ranked the 
community groups on the basis of 24 questions designed to reveal the 
capability of the organization and the "design, impact and budget of 
h . 1 11 31 t eir proposa s . 
DO 
The Board chose to ignore these rankings in favol of a 
closer five-way split. But the defense of their move w�s not justl ll!hat 
the rule of five was reasonable in itself. Kenny Hahn pbjlcted 
that the advisory commission's ranking might show only �ow we 1 anl 
organization can write grants.32 Hahn also wrote a letler to the � 
pointing out that the commission's allocation would notlhale ervel._ 
the neediest Districts of the County well. 33 Thus, mer, t qon ideJ11!tl!.ons 
plus need considerations yielded the rule of five. 
III. 
The rule of five can be viewed as a special ctse lof a f1�� 
percentage allocation. The County offers two examples f fi d I I , allocations, both from the Road Department. Such alloc tions have 
couple of things going for them from the perspective of thls apej 
I , I (1) they reduce uncertainty to a practical minimum, and (2) t ey 
reduce costs of dividing the pie to a minimum. The tim ng of the
1940s vote, just when funds were becoming significant, an b 
tentatively �halked up to increasing relative risk aver ion d I 
increasing competition over percentage points when the ie lis get��� 
bigger. 
In a larger context, where considerations of teed !d miNIITTt 
are electorally important, the rule of five has the pot nt l p perJ��s 
of symmetry and simplicity. These advantages have been e:icPrelssedl� 
Schelling in various ways, and are indicated in the dis us1i°f of 
costs of bargaining and the discussion of "Schelling ef ecbs•( Wl: 
there is not an undeniable need-based formula, and lar e lmolunts 
money are involved, the rule of five may be expected tol be I at! 
a contestant allocational method.34
leasl 
me-
:ever 
APPENDIX 1 
The Mayo-Breed Formula, first used in the late 1940s, 
directed that state gas tax funds be divided 55-45 between the 
southern and northern counties of California. The south felt that, 
21 
since it had roughly 60 percent of population and vehicles, and thus 
generated about 60 percent of revenues, it should get 60 percent of 
the gas tax funds. The Board often went on record urging a 60-40 split. 
In the excerpt below, Mr. Debs argues by analogy for an 
equal split between Supervisorial Districts: 
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1971. 9:30 A.M. 
MR. DEBS: I have one more. Now that the five 
Supervisorial Districts have been reapportioned on pn equal 
population basis, with some losing and others gaining 
additional streets and highway mileage, and in keeping with 
the Board's often-supported policy on the gas tax funds on 
the Mayo-Breed Formula that funds should be equitably 
apportioned to the area from which they arise, I move that 
the Road Commissioner be requested to adjust the financing 
of the construction projects in the various Supervisorial 
Districts. 
CHAIRMAN DORN: Based on population and mileage? 
MR. HAHN: Yes; so that they are all equal --
CHAIRMAN DORN: So ordered. 
MR. HAHN: -- in all five Districts; 20 percent 
of the funds for each District. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The table below gives the number of "new" members in[ each 
2. 
two-year interval since 1920. A member is "new" lif he lwas n 
eler<ed nor appoin<ed in <he previuu' <vu-year ij<erla 
Cf. Fiorina, Rohde and Wissell, "Congressional R]plalenlen
. 
t
.
: 
Historical Examination," for comparable data on ongless. 
Year ff New Members Year ff New Member earl If INew :!:l' 1920 1 1940 o �960 o [
1922 
1924 
1926 
1928 
1930 
1932 
1934 
1936 
1938 
0 
0 
2 
1 
3 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1942 
1944 
1946 
1948 
1950 
1952 
1954 
1956 
1958 
0 
2 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
1 
0 
1 
Polsby considers such variables as years served � Con 
before fire< 'eler<iun a' 'Pe'1<er, average perr"j<agf 
Committees on which seniority was violated, and J�ber lof contested elections in his study of the institut�onali�atiort 
Congress. None of these have compelling analogu1 fbr 
Board. Cf. Nelson Polsby, "The Institutionalization l o 
U.S. House of Representatives," ·APsR 62 (1968): 14 -168. 
ress 
f 
the 
the 
22 
.n 
1bers 
f 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
23 
Public Commission on Los Angeles County Government, The Central 
Executive Structure and Decisiort�Making Processes of the Los 
Angeles County Government (1975)p. 45. 
The position of Chief Administrative Officer was created in 1938 
by the Board (which retains the power to disestablish it at any 
time). The office is designed to provide central administrative 
guidance without constituting a separate and equal executive with 
powers independent of the Board; all Chief Administrative Officer 
powers are received by delegation from the Board and can be 
revoked by a majority vote of three. The position is nonetheless 
a quite powerful and influential one. See ibid., p. 72. 
The quote in the text is the statement of a "public gadfly" 
to the authors of the article. Bob Abernathy and A. White, 
"The Invisible Growth Machine," Los Angeles Times, May 28, 1972, 
West, p. 7. 
Supervisor Kenny Hahn recalls that even though he had studied 
and taught government and was serving as a L.A. City Councilman, 
he did not know what a Supervisor did. That was in 1952, when 
Hahn was asked if he would like to run for a seat on the Board. 
"They told me," Hahn said, "that if I got elected I would only 
have to work one day a week instead of five, and would get paid 
twice as much as a councilman. I looked into it and said to 
7. 
::::�f, 'My God, what a sleeper this is. So I decidled Ito 
The factors accounting for Supervisorial longevity ccdrd 
recognition l adjan one article (ibid.) were: (1) the name 
an incumbent in the large Supervisorial districts, (2) Ith 
of running a campaign ($200-500,000) and (3) masterfullcr 
claiming. A name recognition advantage might stem from t 
placing of incumbent Supervisors' names on most Couj:ity lbu' 
I 
run'u 
ng t 
II age < 
cosl:it! 
ldij 
pamphlets and public information sheets, as well astregular
. newspaper coverage of Board events. Credit-claimin il gage 
in daily simply by providing casework services comp telt anl 
courteously· :l I I Another factor perhaps worth mentioning is the info atil
advantage of incumbents. For example, if the Supelisors are 
doing their job, they are in frequent contact with iti 
politicians and problems (e.g., Supervisor Schabar hls daill 
breakfasts with city officials in his district, rot tihg throl
the cities as the week progresses); a press clippi g sl ice � 
I IIemployed by some Supervisors (at County expense); larg sta£ 
 serves to keep the Supervisor advised of constitue t fee 
("The deputies sort of act as funnels of informati n fkom the -
 We try to keep h vi 
informed about all the calls and all the mail we g�t fro 
public to the Supervisor • 
public in support of this project or against that ne,u 
one of Supervisor Hayes' deputies.) 
weH 
the  
xplai 
I 
d 
An interesting further question about the incumbency 
advantage is: has it been growing? The table in footnote 8 
provides some indication that it has: in the period 1936-56, 
25 
incumbents won 86 percent of the elections they contested, while 
for the period 1958-78, this figure is 96 percent (only one 
incumbent has been defeated since 1958 -- Warren Dorn in 1972). 
If the incumbency advantage has been increasing, the way in which 
we account for this increase may shed light on the recent debate 
over the decline of competition in Congressional elections. See 
Gary Cox,"The Increasing Incumbency Advantage of Los Angeles County 
Supervisors. " 
8. Congressional scholars in the 1970s, influenced by "rational" 
models of economic behavior, sought to construct similar models 
of political behavior. Thus, in the methodological spirit of a 
firm seeking to maximize profits, the various hypotheses have 
been made that Congressmen seek to maximize the probability that 
they will be reelected, the size of their plurality, or the total 
of their votes. These hypotheses are judged both by their 
realism and by their predictive power. As to realism, it is 
asked: does this sound reasonable as something a person might 
actually do? As to predictive power, it is asked: does this 
hypothesis yield falsifiable predictions, which are, nonetheless, 
not falsified? From the latter viewpoint, the hypothesis that 
( A) Congressmen are single-minded seekers of reelection (This
is Mayhew's wording. See David R. Mayhew, Con re s: I e 
Electoral Connection, 5. Note that we have taken a sfe awa� 
from rigor, in the sense that the hypothesis (A) s not embed 
in a complete formal model of official behavior, herla1 the 
I . hypotheses mentioned in the second sentence -- wh ch ca be 
construed as particular efforts at making (A) rig�roub - are 
y I 'I 
26 
d 
is justified if enough observed behavior is explai ble in tj 
of the hypothesis, 
.
even if the hypothesis is not c nsld ed ] 
realistic as a description of the consciously-held gall of 
particular Congressmen. (See Milton Friedman; Ess s I i Pos 'I" e 
Economics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, �951.) , 
one of the first to use the hypothesis (A), considbrel 
s 
passably realistic and predictively powerful. 
Congressmen and Supervisors differ in many retpeetl. Tli 
•haro a bohaviorall y impor"n< �porionc" both m ot I p iodJf 
seek eleetion from single-member dist·i:icts. -Is' this eno[gh J 
similarity so that a rephrasing of (A) with "Supe islrs '  
replacing "Congressmen" is analytically useful in 1ndlrs andi' 
Supervisorial behavior? 
We feel that (A) is less realistic when appli�d to upenl 
th� wh� appliod to C�gr�••�- A glanco at th• 1 taJ1, bololl 
in•pirod by Pr�He' di•cu.,ion in "Poli<irnl "'b[<iL, 
Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability," (APSR 64, ( 970)1, 
indicates why. District 4 especially seems to mee Prew tt• J
criteria of volunteerism: six of the seven post-1 30 Su �rv�. 
reached office originally by appointment, three lekt qy olujl 
lly 
a 
so rs 
p. 5) 
"ILS 
llrY 
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retirement, and incumbents were successful in 93 percent of the 
elections they contested. The unrealism of (A) notwithstanding, 
predictions based on it, e.g., that Supervisors will engage in 
credit-claiming, advertising, and casework, are not clearly 
gainsaid by the evidence. Most Supervisors engage in traditional 
credit-claiming: posting signs proclaiming "another highway 
improvement" with their name on them; and attending the opening 
ceremonies at new parks. News releases put out by the Supervisors 
almost invariably state the Supervisor's name several times on 
the first page. One staff estimated that 40-50 percent of its 
time was spent on casework. Another put the figure at less than 
25 percent for the central office staff and 85-90 percent for the 
field staff. 
9. "Supervisors Ignore Advice, Split up Grant," Los Angeles Times, 
January 24, 1979. 
10. Minutes of the Board of Supervisors for June 11, 1975, p. 38. 
11. The description in this and the next paragraph is based on 
conversations with Norman S. Johnson, Director of the Department 
of Parks and Recreation from the 1950s til 197 4. 
12. Parks Department, Report to the Board of Supervisors on Alternative 
Capital Project Allocation Processes, pp. 25-26. 
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1 3. Mr. Johnson recalls that after reviewing the District budget with 
a chief deputy, inquiry was often made into the status of the 
other Districts. 
14. The description in the last four paragraphs is based in part on 
conversations with Chris Jarvi, presently Head Park Planner. 
15. See Appendix 1 for the minutes of a meeting at which an order 
was made to equalize road construction funds between the 5 
Supervisorial Districts. 
16. Description in this and the next two paragraphs is based on 
conversations with I. L. Merhar, former Road Commissioner, and 
Hugh Dynes, chief deputy of the first District from 19 50 til 1976. 
17. Conversation with Hugh Dynes. 
18. Conversation with Cecil Bugh of the Road Department. 
19. Conversation with John Beke of the Road Department. 
20. 
21. 
Public Commission of Los Angeles County Government, The Los Angeles 
County Road Department, October 1975, p. 20. 
We describe a meeting as follows: a definite time period ( the 
discussion) during which the individuals may transmit a fixed 
number of messages, the messages not to exceed a certain length 
22 . 
23. 
24. 
25. 
and to go to whomever the sender wishes. The number ahd lsize 
of the messages should be ample for communication, wetl ndt 
usable as a weapon to capture time from other indivjiduall : Ifi.· 
ditiJion � majority reach agreement during the discussion on 
the dollar, they submit that division as their vot tol a 
impartial chairman, who then terminates the discusslionr 
the winner and distributes the money. If the discussion 
with no agreement, the dollar disappears. 
The game as presently conceived satisfies conditions a • -
by Fiorina and Plott, "Committee Decisions Under Mali orit 
An Experimental Study, 11  APSR 72 (1978 ): 576. 
I eclar 
I 
ends 
I d pr� 
Rule I 
This is if we are thinking game theory. If we adop 
theoretic standpoint, we see that no voting equilib 
a 1 volting1 
ium elxists 
and that the min-max set is. {x E R5 : x .  � 
1 
1 and 1:"1.  = 1 1  
i-11 
hJ 
illuminating. Coalition theory suggests K again, slnce �t 
contains all minimum winning coalitions. Schelling' s  lb�ious 
point perspective and the "fair" point perspective ug�eslt 
(1/5, . . .  ,1/5). Cf. ibid. , pp. 580-83. 
Note that condition a in ibid. has been violated. I 
The first conjecture is perhaps better seen as emphtsizi�g thl 
the old method of division costs something. A Supe vilorl had
hustle for his funds. 
0 
sed 
y 
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26. Mr. Ford made the reference to need in relation to parks and not
to roads.· . .  He recalled no vote on ·road . funds. 
27. Morris P. Fiorina, "Legislative Facilitation of Government Growth :
Universalism and Reciprocity Practices in Majority Rule
Institutions," Social Science Working Paper 2 26, California 
Institute of Technology : Pasadena, California, 1978.
28. We do not think highly of the rule of five as applied to parks. 
The first point to make is that the County provides local parks 
only to the unincorporated population, the cities taking care of 
their citizens. Thus, ceteris paribus, the first District, with 
320,562 unincorporated population, has greater need than the 
fourth, with 38,210 unincorporated population. Other factors,
such as income, mobility, and amount of existing park acreage, 
should also be considered. The second point is that professional 
park planners consider regional parks to be of County-wide
significance, and prefer to view them in this context. Thus,
Parks Department planners opine that neither local nor regional 
parks are allocated well by the divide-by-five policy. As the
Head Parks Planner complained: "From a planning standpoint, it
really didn't make any sense; you should be putting the money
where the greatest needs are."
29. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 62.
30. Ibid. , p. 65.
31. "Merit Issue Raised," Los Angeles Times,
Part II, p. 3. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Letters to the Editor, Los Angeles Times,
34. Thus, Supervisor Schabarum has proposed the 
various other areas, including Health Services. 
32 
